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Optimal fire-support strategies are studied through
a deterministic differential game using Lanchester-type
equations of warfare. In addition to the MAX-MIN prin-
ciple, the theory of singular extremals is required to
solve this prescribed duration combat problem. The com-
bat is between two heterogeneous forces, each composed
of infantry and a supporting weapon system (artillery).
In contrast to previous work reported in the literature,
the attrition structure of the problem at hand leads to
the optimal fire-support strategy of the attacker requir-
ing him to sometimes split bis artillery fire between
enemy infantry and artillery (counterbattery fire). Nu-
merical examples are given. The military significance
(based on the marginal value interpretation of the dual
variables) of various optimality conditions is discussed.
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TABLE I Notation
x (t), x (t)
,
y,(t), y_(t) -- State variables, number of
survivors of X
, X , Y , Y at time t.
T — Specified duration of the battle.
p (t) , p (t) , q (t) , q 2 (t)
-- Adjoint (dual) variables,
the value of X , X , Y , Y , respectively at time t.
a — Attrition coefficient, average rate at which one
Y attrits X .
a -- Average rate at which one Y attrits X .
b — Average rate at which one X attrits Y .
b_ -- Average rate at which one X attrits Y .
c -- Rate at which Y attrits X .
<f>
-- Decision variable, fraction of Y fire directed at
X., £ <f> <_ 1.
lp -- Fraction of X fire directed at Y , <_ \p <_ 1
.
(J) , iJj




J — Criterion functional, the ratio of the final values





T -- Backwards time, X = T - t.
T, — Backward time at which strategy change occurs for Y,
T. — Backward time at which strategy change occurs for X,
T * -- Backward time at which X„ begins to split his fire,
x f, x f, y f , y f -- Final values of the state variables







2 -b x ft *
— = ;
— e 2 2 i) , The value of this ratio which in-
y f 11
2 sures a singular solution in ty* .

I. INTRODUCTION
The determination of optimal fire distribution stra-
tegies for supporting weapon systems such as artillery,
air resources, or naval gunfire is a major problem of
military operations research. This problem in one form
or another is probably one of the most extensively stud-
ied problems in both the open literature and in classi-
fied sources. The problem is of interest to the military
tactician in hopes of gaining a clearer understanding of
the circumstances under which enemy infantry should be
engaged by a supporting weapon system and those under
which "counter-battery" fire is to be preferred. It
should be stressed that the objective in researching this
problem is not to determine what strategies are employed
by combatants, but rather to attempt to understand what
strategies should be employed for optimal effectiveness.
It is appropriate to briefly sketch past efforts in
the study of "allocation" problems and how this work is
related to those efforts. The problem of the appropriate
mixture of tactical and strategic forces (another aspect
of the optimal fire support strategy problem) was exten-
sively debated by experts during World War II. Some
analysis details may be found in the classical book by
Morse and Kimball [7] . The problem was studied at Rand

in the late 1940's and early 1950's in the form of a tac-
tical air-war [2]. It would probably not be unrealistic
to claim that this problem stimulated early research on
both dynamic programming [1] and on differential games
[2], [3], Today the problem of optimal air-war strate-
gies is being extensively investigated by a number of or-
ganizations (see, for example, [6], [8], [14]).
Another related problem was considered by Weiss [15],
who studied the optimal selection of targets for engage-
ments by a supporting weapon system. Later Taylor [11]
justified the optimality of strategies determined by Weiss
Recently, Kawara [5] studied optimal strategies for sup-
porting weapon systems in an attack scenario which is a
variation of the model that was considered by Weiss [15]
.
Other recent work has considered various conceptual and
computational aspects of the time-sequential combat games
[8] , [9] , [10] .
Since the work here may be considered to be an elabo-
ration upon and extension of Kawara's fire support differ-
ential game [5] , it seems appropriate to review the major
results of that work and to relate this work to it. In
[5] Kawara considered combat between two heterogeneous
forces, each composed of infantry (the primary weapon sys-
tem) and artillery (the supporting weapon system). The
problem required the determination of the optimal strategy
for each side in distributing the fire of its supporting

weapon system over enemy target types. This according to
the criterion of the force ratio of infantry at the end
of the prescribed duration attack scenario. Kawara con-
cludes that each side's optimal strategy for the distri-
bution of its supporting weapon system's fire is to always
concentrate all fire on the enemy's supporting weapon sys-
tem (counter-battery fire) during the early stages of
battle (if the total prescribed length of battle is suffi-
cient) and at an appropriate time switch to concentration
of all fires on the enemy's infantry.
Kawara concludes that this switching time is indepen-
dent of current strength of either side, and dependent
only on the effectiveness of both sides' supporting units.
Moreover, an optimal strategy hc.s the property of always
requiring concentration of supporting fires on enemy in-
fantry during the final stages of battle. Essentially,
Kawara concludes that optimal strategies are independent
of force levels. This conclusion is only true, however,
if the appropriate side's supporting weapon system is not
reduced to a zero force level before a critical time as
illustrated by Isaacs [4] . Given that this is the case,
Taylor shows in [13] that the optimal strategies are a
function of the criterion functional for a given set of
combat attrition equations, and that Kawara considered
the only type of criterion functional (objective function)




The purpose of this work is to illustrate the depen-
dence of the structure of the optimal strategies, for the
case in which neither sides' supporting units are all
lost, upon model form. What is considered here is a
slight variation in Kawara's problem for which the struc-
ture of the optimal strategy of one of the combatants is
significantly different from that in the original problem
[5] : the optimal strategy of one combatant depends
directly upon the enemy's force levels and is no longer
to always concentrate all fire on either the enemy's
primary or supporting weapons system. The optimal stra-
tegy of one side to sometimes split its fire is very
similar to that which occurs in a one-sided (optimal
control) problem considered by Taylor [12] for the opti-
mal distribution of fire by a homogeneous force in combat
against homogeneous forces. [12] was, in fact, partial
motivation for the examination here of another attrition
structure in Kawara's problem.

II. THE MODEL
A. THE DIFFERENTIAL GAME FORMULATION
Consider the following model, cast in the form of a
differential game, of a prescribed duration battle de-
scribing combat between two opposing forces each with
primary and supporting elements.
1-*
FIGURE 1
Maximize Minimize J X (T)/Y (T), with T specified
(1)
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and X 1' X 2' Y 1' Y 2 - ° ' ° - ' * 1 X
where all symbols are defined in Table I.
This model represents a modification of that presented
in Ref. [5] inasmuch as the differential equations describ-
ing the combat dynamics have been altered to allow Y's pri-
mary force, Y
, to attrite X's primary force, X . Also,
the Lanchester square law attrition of X's supporting
force, X , on Y's supporting force, Y has been modified
to linear law attrition.
A scenario that leads to the above mathematical formu-
lation is given below in order that insights gained from
the mathematical solution to this problem can take on
other than abstract significance.
B. COMBAT SCENARIO
A battlefield scenario to which the above model might
be applied involves a conflict between two forces, X and
Y, each with two types of elements; infantry units, X
and Y , and supporting artillery units, X and Y . Con-
sider the situation in which the Y infantry forces are
10

tasked with defending a fortified position and are sup-
ported in this effort by Y's supporting artillery, which
hc.ve the capability of providing a mixture of offensive
fire on attacking units and counter battery fire. The
mission of X's infantry, X , on the other hand, is to
attack that defended position, supported by X's artillery,
X , which can fire a mixture of support for X in the
attack, or provide counter battery fire on Y . Since the
X forces are in the attack, moving toward Y , they are
incapable of causing any attrition on either of Y's ele-
ments. Y , however, although not within its own weapons
range of X can inflict casualties upon the attacking in-
fantry units, X . In this instance the combat duration
T corresponds to the time required for X's infantry to
close to its final assault position where it could begin
inflicting casualties on Y . In this scenario X and Y
are faced with allocating supporting artillery resources,
over the duration of the battle, so that the optimal
value of the ratio of remaining X infantry to remaining
Y infantry at time T is reached.
The scenario presented is the same basically as is
presented by Kawara [5] with the addition of the ability
of Y's infantry to attrite X's infantry. Taylor [13]
shows that an optimal strategy in which a side divides
the fire of its supporting weapons system between the
enemy's primary (infantry) and supporting systems can
11 •

only occur when the enemy's infantry has some effective-
ness against his infantry. Is is this division of fires,
or singular control in the control theory sense, which
most dramatically illustrates the force level dependence
of optimal strategies in this problem.
12

III. DEVELOPMENT OF NECESSARY CONDITIONS OF OPTIMALITY
The development of the solution to the differential
game presented in Chapter Two is similar to that, for an
optimal control problem. However, its complete solution
requires more than the well known MAX-MIN principle [4]
:
the theory of singular extremals must be utilized in its
solution. A brief discussion of that theory is given in
Ref . [12] .
Before applying the above theory to the problem at
hand it should be pointed out that the combat dynamics,
i.e. Equations (1) through (5), and the fact that the
combat duration T is finite, yield that X , Y , Y will
always be greater than zero. It is possible that X could
be forced to zero; however, since X controls the decision
variable ip, and the case of interest is that in which no
supporting units are forced to a zero level, X will be
assumed positive.






































where p. (t) and q. (t) are dual variables associated with




By the MAX-MIN principle
MAX MIN H(X ,X ,Y1# Y ,p ,p ,q ,q ,l(>,$,t) = MAX MIN J
However, because of separability properties of the Hamil-





























(t) as the switching functions
for X and Y, respectively, where
V fc) = b l Y i q i - b 2 Y 2^2
S^t) = a
2
X lPl - cp 2
(7)
(8)







if S (t) > (9)
undetermined if S. (t) =
1 if S,(t) >
<P
if S A (t) < (10)
undetermined if S,(t) =
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The time history of using these controls is given by
the state and adjoint equations below with boundary con-
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-"f^ = a i Y iPi + * a 2 Y 2 p 2 » Pi (t=T) =Y7TTT (15)
dP
2 -3H







+ * b i x 2«i ; qi (t=T)=-Y7(TT (17)
dq
d"r
= W2 =*a2 XlPl+ (l-cD)cP2+ (l^)b2X2q2 ; q2 (t=T)=0 (18)
The necessary conditions for extremal controls given
in (9) and (10) allow the determination of optimal con-
trols at battle termination T. This is accomplished by
noting that

























Applying the boundary conditions to Equations (15) through
(18) , and noting that force levels are all positive for
t<T, yields S,(t = T)<0 and S (t = T)>0 implying that ip*(T)=l
and 9* (T) =1.
This information allows the determination of extremal
controls when either of the switching functions, S. (t) or
S, (t) are identically zero. It is at this point in the
9
development of the solution that the theory of singular
solutions must be called upon.
In the discussion to follow a singular subarc will
denote that part of an optimal trajectory on which the
MAX-MIN principle cannot be used to determine the control,
because the coefficient of the control variable in the
Hamiltonian is zero. The term "singular solution" will be
used to denote any optimal trajectory which contains one
or more singular subarcs.
In partial elaboration relative to the problem at
hand, since the Hamiltonian H is a linear function of both
7i H 7i H




( t ) ) vanish for a finite interval of time, then
as in the case in (9) and (10) above, all feasible values
of the respective control optimize the Hamiltonian. When
this occurs the singular control is determined by requir-
ing that the appropriate switching function, and all of
16

its time derivatives, be zero for that finite time
period
.










dt -C {^b 1 Y i q i +(l-^)b 2 Y 2 q 2 }
The existence of a singular subarc in <p requires that





< \p < 1
V Y 2 > °
g j





can be shown that q . <0 yt £[0 , T] ; therefore, -r—* txs repre-
sented by a convex combination of negative quantities and
cannot be zero. No singular solutions exist in <}>
.
dS.





-^V^ + b 2 Y 2^2 }
and the product i|>S (t ) < OVt CIO , T] implying that
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-—2- > VtCtO,T], but S, (T) > so there is at most one
at <p
switch in Y's decision variable from
<f>* = to <f>* = l which
would occur when S,(t) = 0.
This information allows for the investigation into
singular behavior of X's strategic variable, \|> , under the
two possible values of <j>*.
Consider first what general conditions are necessary
in order for a singular solution to exist in 4> by setting
successive time derivatives of S (t) equal to zero until
\\) appears explicitly in one of those derivatives. From
V t} = b l Y iq i - b 2 Y 2^2 " °
and
dS (t)
dT" = a ib l X l Y lPr b 2 CY 2 P 2- <},b 2 Y 2 (a 2 X lPl- CP2 ) =
two conditions necessary for the existence of a singular
subarc are:















X lPl + (l-<| ) )cp 2 }
* ds.(t)
Additionally, 1 -) contains ^ explicitly, sodt dt





'V b 2 X 2 [ * a 2 X l P l + ( 1 - <J> ) CP 2 ]
This expression, however, gives the value of the
singular control for X as a function of Y's strategic
18

variable, <J>*. Therefore, there are two singular control
values to be considered corresponding to the two possible
values of (j>*.
1. Case I ; (<j)* = l), for this case the conditions










aiVl = a 2 b 2 Y 2 (19)
and the singular control is
**(t) V b 2 (20)
2. Case II ; (4>* = 0) , for this case the conditions
for the existence of the singular control are
b Y Q = b Y q
1 14 1 2 2 4 2
abXYp =bcYq
1 1 1 lp l 2 2 4 2
(21)








A further check can be made on these singular controls
to insure a maximum return from the criterion functional,
J, in the form of a further necessary condition, the
generalized Legendre-Clebsh condition,
(_D k JL {^ (M) } < o
19

which necessarily must be met for a singular subarc to
yield a maximum return. In the problem at hand it suf-
fices to check this condition for K=l, and, it can be
shown that the condition is met for both singular controls





if S, (t) <0 (23)
1 if S (t)<0
if S (t)>0
if>*(t) = if S , (t)=0 for ab, +b„ 4>
1 2 finite period of time






(1- 2 2 ) if S (t)=0 for a
X
2 P 2 finitfe period of
time and <}>* =
20

IV. SYNTHESIS OF EXTREMAL CONTROLS
A. METHOD OF SYNTHESIS
By the synthesis of extremal controls is meant the
explicit determination of the time history of the extremal
controls from initial to terminal state. This is accom-
plished by combining the extremal controls with integra-
tion of the state and adjoint systems of equations. The
specific procedure used in the solution to the problem at
hand is to begin at battle termination, T, where extremal
controls are known, assuming final values for state vari-
ables. This in turn yields the boundary conditions on
the set of adjoint equations in terms of those final
values. The procedure is then to solve the system of dif-




equations combined with ——— and ——— , the differentialdt dt
equations describing the behavior of the switching func-
tions over time. The solution of this system of equations
and in particular the values of S, (t) and S, (t) yield the
extremal controls over time through Equations (23) and (24)
In order to facilitate this procedure it is convenient
to make a change of variable to transform the set of
boundary conditions at t=T into initial conditions for
the described system of differential equations. This is
accomplished by converting to "backwards" time, T=T-t,
and noting that dT = -dt.
21

The procedure is then to integrate the above set of
differential equations in "backwards" time from x=0 until
the first change in tactics occurs for either X or Y. The
time at which that switch occurs is then regarded as an
artificial terminal surface from which initial conditions
can again be computed for the new system of differential
equations as altered by the new control. This procedure
is repeated at each succeeding tactic change until T=T.
By beginning at T=0 with all possible elements of the set
of terminal values of the state variables, a field of ex-
tremal trajectories, resulting from extremal controls,
could be mapped out such that for any initial state in
forward time t at least one candidate optimal trajectory
could be found that would lead to the set of possible
final values and thus max-min of the criterion functional
If more than one trajectory satisfying the derived neces-
sary conditions arrive at t=T at different values of the
criterion functional the higher value would be taken and
the trajectories leading to other terminal states would
be deleted.
Since the control displaying the most interesting
behavior is iJj*, X's decision variable, and since <(>*, Y's
decision variable, takes on only two values, or 1, it
is convenient to break the synthesis of extremal controls





4»* = 1, T£[T,,0] - or from t = T to the artificial
terminal surface described by switch in Y's control,
2 Region II :
4* = 0, T£-[T,T, ] - or from t = t, to t = 0.
The procedure is then to develop the time history of
ty* over each region.
B. SYNTHESIS OF EXTREMAL CONTROLS - REGION I
The investigation into the behavior of extremal con-
trols proceeds at this point over Region I, where 4>* = 1,
beginning at T=0 where the optimal controls at battle
termination were previously shown to be ^* = 1» <J>* = 1.
Looking in "backwards" time from x=0, there are two con-
tingencies to consider. A strategy change can occur for
X, in which case a new artificial terminal surface will
be considered, or the strategy change can occur for Y in
which case the solution enters Region II.
The system of differential equations transformed to
"backwards" time which describe the battle trajectory
under controls ij>* = l, <J)* = 1 and their initial conditions at
T=0 are given below.
State Equations
dX.













^r = b i Y i x 2 | Y 1 (T=0) = Y x (27)
dY.
dT = ; Y 2 (T = 0) = Y 2 (28)
Adjoint. Equations
dp,








































l5^= " X l P l (a i b l Y l- a 2 b 2 Y 2 ); S ^ (T = 0)= -—f- (34)
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(T) =-a2rT T (42)
Switching Functions
rVlV-VlV , "l^ n V2
f



































T - bl > (44)
Utilizing Equations (43) and (44), the time of the
first tactic change can be determined as the time at which
either S, (x) or S, (X) first goes to zero. From this point
it is obvious that if SjT) = but S.(x) < then the
<P V
tactic change that occurs is <f>* = l to <{>* = with X = X, , and
25

the solution is now in Region II. If, however, the final
values of the state variables chosen were such that
S,(T)=0, and S,(T) remains greater than zero, then the
switch that occurs is in X's decision variable, l|/ * , from
b
2
\1>* = 1 to \p* = or to ty* = , the singular control.
1 2
This describes three cases to be examined based on the
decision variable, ty* , in Region I.
1. Case I
^* switches from 1 to
a . . Sub-case 1(a)
Vb 2 , the singular control.





and \p* remains the singular
subarc until T = T
b. Sub-case I (b)
iji* = l to ty* = to U)* = l before T = T,b, +b„ (j)1 2
c . Sub-case 1(c)
ty*=l to ty*= 7— to U; * = before T = X,b 1+ b 2 4>
2. Case II
lp* = 1 to ty* = until T = T,
3. Case III
i/j* = 1 VtC[T,/0] corresponding to no switch in i^*
before (}>* = 1 to <J)* = 0.
It is convenient at this point to pursue the develop-
ment of Case I, and in particular since the behavior of
extremal controls is being examined in "backwards" time
as a function of value of state variables at battle termi-
nation, to determine what relationships between those
26

final values satisfy the previously derived necessary
conditions for attaining the singular subarc in T£[T,,0]
<P
Those conditions are
Vi q i = b 2 Y 2*2
a,b Y - a b,Y111 222
at T*, where T * is the "backwards' time of entry onto




Forming the ratio of the above conditions yields the
below single condition necessary for the original condi-







From (45) above and Equations (41) and (42) the fol-




















Using the second of the conditions given in (19)
aiVl = a 2 b 2 Y 2 3tV
and Equations (37) and (38) evaluated at T * yield the
following relationship between Y and Y which satis-















ITbT Y i e
2 2
(47)
Since (46) and (47) above yield the values of T . * and
Y from given final values of the other state variables,
X, , X_ , Y, , it is convenient to base further investiga-
1 2 1 f f *
1 1tion on the ratio — , with — being the particular
Y Y
2 2
value of that ratio which insures entry onto the singular
b„
subarc where \p* = at T *b,+b„ l|>
1 2
The convenience of using this ratio lies in the fact






















^ > o y^Cto,!^]
The three cases presented for examination can now be
further defined thusly:












b,c dependent only on being the singular subarc.
















_ => ,|,* = i VTCtT
^
f0]
These cases are developed fully with respect to the
behavior of state and adjoint variables and switching
times X , and T . in order to obtain a complete synthesis
of extremal trajectories in Region I as a function of
final state" variable values.
1 . Case I
f f *
Y Y b11 2
T = T-r , <J;* = 1 to ip* = , the singular
Y„
f yJ b l +b 2
control in Region I.
The history of the conflict for t£[0,T.*] is given
by Equations (35) through (44). The system of differen-
tial equations given below describe the battle history
b„







T,* is treated as an artificial terminal surface so that
boundary conditions can be computed by evaluating Equa-




















































































TT = Cb 2 Y 2^2 (56)
dS
JT- =
- X lPl (a ib l Y l- a 2 b 2 Y 2 ) (57)
From Equations (48) through (57) the following closed
form solutions were developed.
State Equations



























P^T) = P;L (T *)EXP[- ^-f (a 1Y1 (x *)+a2Y2
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(a
i
YlV )+a2Y2 )(1" 6 )} (63)
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ax -VX (T-T *) ax
q 2
(T) = [q <T * )+ JLf^e *
















ing function which yields T. is
s
$








1 f ^2 tT~V J
TTTi (aiYi (V )+a2Y2 )(1"e * )} (66)(vx
2
) Y;L
T. is given when S, (T) = 0.
<P <P
In considering subcases 1(b) and 1(c) it must be
pointed out that these cases are included to complete
the trajectory field in "backwards" time. There are no
means of analytically solving for T , the "backwards"
e
time of exit from the singular subarc (corresponding to
entry onto the singular subarc in forward time) , these
times are chosen in order to provide an .extremal trajec-
tory corresponding to all initial states at t=0.
*
b











the time history of the battle for T(~[0,T,*] is again
given by Equations (35) through (44). The behavior for
32

t€It.*,T ] is given by Equations (58) through (66).
The system of differential equations applying for
T£:[T , T,] are Equations (25) through (34), but with
^- e (p
initial conditions computed at the artificial terminal
surface at T by evaluating Equations (58) through (66)
at T .
e
The behavior of system variables and switching func-




a Y (T ) b X (T-r )
X
n
(T) = X, (T ) EXP[- 1 X . 6 (1-e X Z e ) +



















(T) = Y. (T )e
1 1 e
Y_ (T) = Y_ (T )
2 2 e





a Y (x ) b X (T-T )
P, (T) = p. (T ) EXP[
e (1-e X Z e ) -
1 x e b X
f
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b X (T-T )
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Again the time history of the battle for t£[0,t *]
and T£(T.*,T ] are given by Equations (35) through (44)
and (58) through (66) respectively.
The solutions to the set of differential equations
describing the conflict for tC(t ,t.] with extremal con-
e
<J>
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The switching function for <b* , S,(T) which yields T,
when S,(T) = is
9
SA<T >
= SA<T > + Cb Y_(T )[(q,(T )+




































The behavior of the conflict for TGtT.,0] is given by
Equations (35) through (44). For TCtT,,T,), where T, is
the time of tactic change for X other than a change to the
singular solution, the system of differential equations
describing the conflict are identical to those which yield
the solutions given for Case 1(c). For this case the
36

initial conditions are derived by computing the values of
Equations (35) through (44) at the artificial terminal sur-
face described by T . The solution to that set of equa-
tions with initial conditions as described are
State Equations
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q,<T) = [<q2 (T.)+ ^~) e * - ± ] (92)V V2 Y 1 V2 Y1




= yy + cb2Y 2f[(q2 (v +
a



























The behavior of system variables over time is given by
Equations (40) through (44) throughout Region I with the
only switch in tactics being from <j)* = l to <})* = 0, T A for
<P
this case is given by Equations (44) when S, (T) = 0.
C. SYNTHESIS OF EXTREMAL CONTROLS - REGION II
The previous discussion has given a complete and some-
what comprehensive description of all possible sequences
of values of X's strategic variable meeting the necessary
conditions of optimality (extremal trajectories) when
<J>* = 1. What remains is to describe the remainder of those
trajectories over Region II, tC(t , ,T] , where <J)* = 0.
Because in general, closed form solutions to the equa-
tions describing the battle history over this region are
38

intractable, the synthesis of extremal trajectories must
be accomplished in a less analytical fashion. This will
be done by utilizing the experience gained in the behavior
of controls over Region I, and insights into the battle
history in Region II gleaned from the various systems of
state and adjoint equations.
It is again convenient to discuss extremal behavior
based on three cases corresponding to the value of ip* at
T, as given below:
1. Case I: ll)* = at T,
~
2. Case II: \b* = l at X.
<J>
3. Case III: b 2
b 1+b 2 <j>
Cases I and II can easily be related to those trajec-







tively. Also included in these cases are trajectories
which exited the singular subarc in Region I and which
ended with the proper value of ty* at T, . For the discus-
sion to follow it is important to recognize that for the
portion of extremal trajectories which exited the singular
subarc to i];* = or ip* = l, comments concerning trajectories













The system of differential equations describing the
battle history with ip* = 0, <f>* = beginning at the artificial
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terminal surface described by T, are given below with
<P
initial conditions at T,.
State Equations
dX








































dT = - (cp 2 +b 2 X 2 q 2 ) (99)
Switching Functions
dS.
TT = b 2 CY 2 q 2 (100)
dT^ = b 2 CY 2 P 2 " a i b l X l Y lPl (101)
f f *
Y Y
1 1Recalling that for values of — < — which corres-
dS f
*




















additionally (94) and (95) above show that Y remains con-
stant under \p* = 0, <j>* = strategies while Y is increasing,
implying that (102) will remain true as long as the above
controls hold. The monotonacity of S, (x) yields,
V T) = a 2 X lP l " CP 2 i ° VTCtT^T]
or a X d < cd
2 1F 1 - F 2
(103)
with equality holding only at X . Equation (101) yields
the behavior of S, (T) under strategies ip * = , <J>* = accord-
ing to
dS
-df " b 2Y 2 (cp 2 ) (a ib l Y l )X lP l
*


















and substituting for cp from (103) yields
dS
dT > b 2 Y 2 (a 2 X lP l ) - (a 2 b 2 Y 2 )X l P l " °
dS
r ——*- > under strateqno - - U gies 4>* = 0, <J)* = 0. Since \p* = at x,
then S, (X.) > 0. Then for Case I there are no further
strategy changes for X for x > X, . This can be extended
to the fact that once iJj* = in Region II it will remain at
that value until x = T.
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The battle history of using strategy ty*=l, 4>* = under
Case II are given below:
State Equations
dX,
dT " a i X l Y l
dX
IT = CY 2
dY
l





















































There are three possible trajectories in Region II




(a) \\>* = 1 to ip* =
(b) lp*=l VtC[t,t )







Unfortunately, no general conditions have been found which
indicate which of the first two occur, nor has it been
determined if the third switch is actually possible. For
any given set of parameters numerical techniques can be
employed on Equations (104) through (113) using the digital
computer to determine which of the first or second possible
trajectories actually occur. It would, however, be vir-
tually impossible to determine if the third possibility
occurred due to numerical accuracy required to monitor
whether or not necessary conditions are met and maintained.
b.Case III , . . 2
b 1 + b 2
trajectories to consider.













b 1+ b 2
to the singular control in Region II,
b Y q
2




It can be shown that the first and second "backwards"
time derivatives of S. (t) , X's switching function, can be
written
dS (X) X





















(X.) it is found, since S,(x.) =dx
(J) <$> <J)











2 {¥2V¥2 [**bl- (1-*^2)Jdx (116)
which, because of the fact that







dx <j) 4» <j)
controls by its sign which of the three possible extremals
is optimal






\b + 2 q 2
Y
2
f(X. )= -c(b_) p_X-Y.(l - ~^-) <
2 (f) 2 2 2 2 2 P 2
so that 3 6 > 0«> • S.(X) < vxC(x.,x.+6)
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If ^*<T)=1 for TC(T. ,T,+6) , then
—/(T. )= cb (b +b„)p_X9Y {l-(—|—)(1- zrrr)}
dT 2 (j.
2 12 2 2 2 b1+b2 X2p2















Y 2 imP lies that
\1> +
-(T, ) > =>
dT 2
^<}>
36 > o • » • s (x) > o vtq(t ,t.+S) .






d% (V } > Q
dT 2
b
lP 2 (VVV - " b 2 q 2 (VW-
It is also clear that in addition to the necessary con-
ditions for attaining the singular subarc in Region II that
b q Y























It is true then that for T = T, and b,p_ (T , ) X_ (T , ) >
<p 1 2 9 2 (J) —











lp* = (_!|_)(1.!2!i)if £!t(T/) .b,+b„ X_p_ ,2 <p






If b lP 2 (V X 2 (V * - b 2 q 2 (T (fr )Y 2 (T <(. ) lfc iS °nlY
possible to have i/j * = for t£(t,,t,+6).
As in Case II general conditions have not been dis-
covered indicating which strategy is followed for all
cases but, it is apparent that since the synthesis is pro-
ceeding in "backwards" time, there exists some final state
at T=0 for which each of the possible strategies are used
at T = T,. This must be the case in order to map an extremal
trajectory to every initial state at T=T.
The battle history for (a) and (b) above are given by
Equations (92) through (101) or (104) through (113) respec-
tively. If the singular trajectory is followed the equa-













dT" = **Vl X 2 (120)
dY
2





















dFT = -<cp 2+(i-**)b 2 x 2 q 2 ) (125)
Switching Function
dS .
-^ = cCt^T q1+ (l-f)b 2* 2q ) (126)
dS
hi












V. SOME NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
Using the IBM System 360 Computer, and by following
the general procedure for synthesis of extremal controls
as outlined in Chapter IV, that is, choosing a final state
at T=0 and integrating the state and adjoint equations in
backwards time, numerical solutions to this differential
game for several parameter sets were obtained. Each solu-
tion is given in the form of a trajectory field (a field
of trajectories leading to different final states). Be-
cause the state space of the differential game is actually
five dimensional, (four state variables and time), and be-




the ratio — , the trajectory fields are displayed on
Y 2




space, by plotting the ratio versus time. This pro-
Y 2 (T)
cedure yields a clear picture of the behavior of ty* , X's
strategy variable, as a function of time. The field of
trajectories is generated by varying only Y
Integration of the state and adjoint equations in
backwards time was accomplished using a fourth order Runge
Kutta numerical integration technique. Times at which
strategy changes occur for X and Y were computed using a
Newton-Rhapson scheme when closed form solutions for the
switching functions existed. Where this was not possible
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strategy changes were determined to occur with sign
changes in the appropriate switching functions. Addition-
ally throughout Region I, where <j>* = l, actual values of
system variables were determined from closed form solu-
tions at the above switching times. The Runge Kutta tech-
nique employed was verified against one of those closed
form solutions and found to produce an error no greater
than 10~ .
Two examples of the results obtained are presented
here in Figures 6 and 7. The model parameters are given
below the figures.
Figure 6 clearly shows the time history of X*s strat-
egy for achieving different final states. Also clearly
shown are the singular subarcs (the dark heavy lines)
which correspond to X splitting his supporting fires be-
tween Y and Y (these are called universal surfaces in
the terminology of Isaacs [4]. These universal surfaces
divide the state space of the game into regions where
X's optimal strategy is to concentrate his fire on either
Y's supporting elements, ty*=0 (below the surface), or on
his primary force, t|>* = l (above the surface) .
Figure 7 results from a slight modification to the
parameter set which yields Figure 6. In this case a dif-
ferent value of Y is chosen and again Y is varied.
For this particular set of parameters the extremal field
is identical to Figure 6 throughout the region where <J>* = 1;
however, there is a void in the solution space where <}>* = 0,
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and the singular subarc appears in Figure 6. This void
occurs because at T,, where <(>* switches from <}>* = 1 to
(j>* = and \p* must also change from
\\>* = V b 2 to ifl' b 1 +b 2 (1 - V2p 2 x 2
it is found that the second of the singular controls
violates the inequality constraint on ip* , that is, i|>* > 1.
For the particular case shown in Figure 7 \p* = 1.0543061.
Extreme care was taken to insure that the violation
of the constraint on ^* is not a function- of numerical
accuracy in generating solutions, and it appears at this
writing that the dual variables, P. and q., may be discon-
b







this discontinuity occurs is due to the fact that extremal
strategies for both X and Y must change simultaneously at
the above point. The existence of such discontinuity con-
stitutes a violation of an underlying assumption in the
theory utilized in the solution of this differential game.
The investigation into that contingency is, however,
beyond the scope of this work.
The program which generates the solutions presented
here is available from Professor J. G. Taylor, Department
of Operations Research, U. S. Naval Postgraduate School.
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VI. MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MAX-MIN PRINCIPLE
By examination of the switching functions, S,(t) and
S.(t), and their derivatives, interpretations of the con-
ditions for when strategy changes occur, and for which
strategies are chosen can be derived. The interpretation
of these conditions is similar to marginal value interpre-
tation familiar to economists.
It has been previously shown that a change in the Y




1 )p 1 = cp 2
From the Lanchester "linear law" attrition of X's primary
force, X
, and from the "square law" attrition of X's sup-
porting force, X , by Y's supporting force, Y , the term
"a X " and the coefficient "c" have interpretations "rate
of destroying X by an element of Y ", and "rate of des-
troying X per unit Y ", respectively. Additionally, P.
can be interpreted as being the marginal value of each
surviving unit of X. . From this it is easily seen that Y
1
changes his supporting weapon allocation only when Y's
rate of destroying the value of X is the same by firing at
either X's primary or supporting weapons. Y fires counter-
battery, <}>* = 0, only so long as (a X )p < cp , or as long
as the rate of destroying X's value is greater by firing
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at his supporting force than by firing at his primary
force. Conversely Y fires at X's primary force, <J>* = 1,
only when he receives the highest rate of destroying X's
value with that strategy.










where "b Y " is the rate of destroying Y.. by a unit of X
,
and "b_Y " is the rate at which one X_ attrites Y^. q. is
2 2 2 2 l
the marginal value to the battle of a single Y. survivor.
Again, X changes strategy only when he receives the same
rate of destroying Y's value by firing at either Y's sup-
porting force or his primary force. The strategy X chooses
dS
,
when this condition is met depends upon the sign of .
This derivative has a different form under each of Y's
strategies. For <j)* = l
dS.1 = (a.b.Y. - a ob_Y )X.p.dt ' 1 11 2 2 2' 1^1
and it has been shown that X splits his fire according to
b
2
\b* = r~ if b n (a,Y n ) = b„(a_Y_). This condition saysb,+b„ 1 11 2 12.
1 2
that X splits his fires only if he has equal ability to
destroy each of the Y elements' kill capability against
his primary force. X allocates his fires in such a way as
to maintain this condition by allocating his fires in
amounts equal to his relative effectiveness against each
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of Y's force types. If he does not have equal ability to
destroy the kill capability of each of Y's force types
against his infantry, he chooses his strategy to achieve
that ability. That is, if b (a Y ) < b (a Y ) , and he is
less effective in destroying Y 's capability to destroy his
primary force than in destroying Y's ability to destroy
that force, he concentrates his fire on Y. , i|j* = 1, in an
attempt to achieve this parity. The same rational applies
in choosing to concentrate on Y , i^« * = .










1 )p 1 -b 2 (cY 2 )p 2








1 )p 1 = b 2 (cY 2 )p 2
then X splits his fires subject to i|r 2 ^2 2(1
- v~r )P 2 X 2b +b1 2
The interpretation of this condition is that X splits his
fire in order to maintain equal capability of destroying
Y's ability to reduce the value of each of his force types
It should be noted, however, that for this split of fire
he again allocates in amounts equal to his relative effec-
tiveness against each of Y's force types, but because Y is
concentrating fire on X , this is weighted by the ratio of
total value of surviving Y to total value of surviving X
This has the qualitative interpretation of weighting the
split by an amount proportional to how much X feels he
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must reduce Y^ in order to account for the attrition he
2
is suffering. This split becomes ————— when (J)* = l and Y.
1 2
is no longer firing at X„.
As for the case where <{>* = 1, X again chooses his strat-
egies so as to attain this parity in his ability to destroy
Y's capability of reducing his value through each of his
force types.
Figure 6 illustrates this choice of strategies by X
which force him to parity in the conditions described
above. Once parity in those conditions is achieved, X





The solution to the differential game presented here
illustrates the dependence of optimal strategies on force
levels through each opponent's switching function. Where
this dependence is not explicit in those switching func-
tions it is implicit via the marginal values (i.e., dual
variables) which may themselves be functionally dependent
on those force levels. This dependence of optimal strat-
egies on force levels is best illustrated in the problem
at hand by the strategy of X in which he splits his fire
2 2 2
according to \b* = ;— (1 - ) while Y is concentrat-b 1+ b 2 p 2 x 2
ing all of his fire on X's supporting elements, (J)*=0.
This strategy illustrates a case where the optimal alloca-
tion policy is not only dependent on force levels through
the switching function, but is itself a function of two
i
of those force levels.
This problem when compared to that presented by Kawara
[5] illustrates that the nature of the attrition process
in a differential game combat model has significant impact
on optimal strategies. Again this is best illustrated
here by the appearance of an extremal strategy in which X
splits his fire between the two Y elements. This splitting
of fire which does not appear in Kawara ' s problem was in-
duced with only minor modification of Kawara's attrition
57

structure, and by allowing Y's primary force to attrite
X's primary force. Because of this sensitivity of optimal
strategies to changes in the attrition structure, care
must be taken when attempting to model the combat decision
making process in a differential game to insure that in-
sights gained into optimal strategies are not biased by
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